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In Tennessee v. Garner,1 the United States Supreme Court re-
jected the common law rule which had permitted the use of deadly
force to prevent the escape of an unarmed suspected felon. The
Court held that deadly force cannot be used to prevent an escape
unless the arresting officer has probable cause to believe that the
suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical in-
jury to the officer or others.2 The United States Supreme Court
noted that "apparently" Virginia was one of the few jurisdictions
still following the common law rule. However, the only Virginia au-
thority cited, Berry v. Hamman,3 involved an armed and danger-
ous felon. Because the decision in Berry is not inconsistent with
the rule announced in Tennessee v. Garner, the United States Su-
preme Court may have clarified the constitutional principle appli-
cable in Virginia, but the decision does not appear to constitute a
major change in Virginia law.
The 1985 General Assembly made two minor changes in the law
of arrests. The authority to make a warrantless arrest at the scene
of a motor vehicle accident was extended to include arrests "at any
hospital or medical facility to which any person involved in such
accident has been transported."4 The General Assembly also pro-
vided for the destruction of unexecuted warrants or other criminal
process "after determining that . . . [such process] is un-
* This survey addresses only significant Virginia cases and statutes affecting Virginia
criminal procedure. For discussion of the impact of federal court decisions, see R. BACIGAL,
VIRGINIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Supp. 1985).
** Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.S., 1964,
Concord College; LL.B., 1967, Washington & Lee University.
1. 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985).
2. Id. at 1701.
3. 203 Va. 596, 125 S.E.2d 851 (1962).
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81 (Cure. Supp. 1985).
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prosecutable due to lack of evidence, witnesses or other legal
reason."
5
B. Stop and Frisk (Brief Detentions of a Person)
The United States Supreme Court continues to struggle with the
definition of a "stop" for purposes of the fourth amendment.6 Most
lower courts have accepted the United States v. Mendenhall test
of whether "a reasonable person would have believed that he was
not free to leave."'7 But in Addison v. Commonwealth,8 the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court cited a District of Columbia circuit court de-
cision which rejected the Mendenhall standard and adopted the
test of "whether a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would
have felt free to walk away under the circumstances." 9 According
to this test, a stop/seizure is determined by examination of all the
circumstances surrounding the incident, and the apparent guilt or
innocence of the defendant may be one of the relevant
circumstances.
The Virginia Supreme Court has also recognized that a "frisk"
may extend beyond the person of the suspect. Lansdown v. Com-
monwealth'0 recognized that the authority to frisk armed and dan-
gerous persons extends to the passengers of a vehicle stopped for
speeding and attempting to evade arrest. In Jones v. Common-
wealth," the court held that, in addition to a pat down, the police
may make reasonable inquiries to determine identity and may
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more
information.'2
5. Id. § 19.2-76.1.
6. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984); Immigration and Naturalization
Serv. v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984); Florida v. Rodriguez, 461 U.S. 940 (1984); Florida v.
Roger, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
7. 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
8. 224 Va. 713, 299 S.E.2d 521 (1983).
9. Id. at 719, 299 S.E.2d at 524 (emphasis in original) (citing Gomez v. Turner, 672 F.2d
134 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
10. 226 Va. 204, 212, 308 S.E.2d 106, 111 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1604 (1985).
11. 230 Va. -, 334 S.E.2d 537, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2713 (1985).
12. Id. at -, 334 S.E.2d at 540.
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C. Search and Seizure
Winston v. Lee"3 brought the Virginia and federal courts into
conflict and attracted considerable national attention. The Virginia
court issued an order for surgical removal of a bullet from the sus-
pect's body, but the United States Supreme Court found that such
a procedure would constitute an unreasonable search and seizure.14
The dramatic facts of Winston v. Lee moved the United States
Supreme Court to adopt an additional test for defining constitu-
tional searches. The Court noted that the defendant had been
given "a full measure of procedural protections" required by the
warrant clause of the fourth amendment.15 However, notwithstand-
ing the existence of probable cause, the Court found that the rea-
sonableness clause of the fourth amendment requires a more sub-
stantial justification than that required by the warrant clause. 6
The decision in Winston thus authorizes two distinct lines of at-
tack upon searches and seizures: (1) either the procedures of the
warrant clause were not followed; or (2) an extreme invasion of pri-
vacy violated the substantive values contained within the reasona-
bleness clause of the fourth amendment.
17
While a search of the suspect's body was limited in Winston, the
extent of a search of the premises was expanded in Poyner v. Com-
monwealth,8 where the magistrate properly authorized a search of
the entire premises even though the suspect rented a single room.
The suspect, in fact, had the "run of the house," and therefore, the
court upheld the search of the entire house.' 9
In Garza v. Commonwealth,0 the court explicitly recognized
what had long been implicit-that probable cause for a search
could no longer be seen as an inflexible standard. The court noted
that probable cause is a fluid concept, turning on the assessment of
13. 105 S. Ct. 1611 (1985).
14. Id. at 1620.
15. Id. at 1618. The court ordered surgery after a full adversary hearing on the issue. In
most situations there is an ex parte determination of probable cause by a magistrate.
16. Id. at 1615-18; see also Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985) (deadly force used
to seize a non-dangerous felon held to be unreasonable notwithstanding the existence of
probable cause).
17. But cf. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 307 S.E.2d 864 (1983) (recognizing
that a suspect may consent to a seizure of body fluids), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1617 (1984).
18. 229 Va. 401, 329 S.E.2d 815, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 208 (1985).
19. Id. at 411-12, 329 S.E.2d at 824.
20. 228 Va. 559, 323 S.E.2d 127 (1984).
1985] 699
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probabilities in particular factual contexts.21 Thus, in McCary v.
Commonwealth,22 the court could state:
On finding a car exactly matching the description and bearing one of
the two possible license numbers, the officers clearly had probable
cause to believe the vehicle was the robber's getaway car and that it
contained fruits of the crimes, weapons, or evidence as to the iden-
tity and whereabouts of the robber. 3
Garza also adopted the Illinois v. Gates24 totality of the circum-
stances test for probable cause in place of the two-pronged test of
Aguilar v. Texas.25 The court further noted that "a statement of
the source of the affiant's information, while required by the fourth
amendment, is not mandated by Code § 19.2-54. 126 Thus an affi-
ant's oral statement of facts establishing the reliability of an in-
formant satisfies constitutional requirements.
The Virginia Supreme Court rendered three significant decisions
on warrantless searches. McCary v. Commonwealth27 noted that
the immediate need to continue a promising criminal investigation
is "within the spirit, though not the text, of the 'hot pursuit' ex-
ception. 28 In Wellford v. Commonwealth,29 the court applied the
open fields doctrine,30 but distinguished open fields from the curti-
lage of dwelling houses.3 ' Finally, in Boggs v. Commonwealth,2 the
court cleared up some of the confusion surrounding the opening of
containers and held "that the search of a closed container, discov-
21. Id. at 564, 323 S.E.2d at 129; see also Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1699 (referring to this fluid
balancing of privacy and government interests as the key principle of the fourth
amendment).
22. 228 Va. 219, 321 S.E.2d 637 (1984).
23. Id. at 228, 321 SE.2d at 641.
24. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
25. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
26. McCary, 228 Va. at 231, 321 S.E.2d at 643.
27. 228 Va. 219, 321 S.E.2d 637 (1984).
28. Id. at 229, 321 S.E.2d at 642; see also United States v. Shelton, 737 F.2d 1292 (4th
Cir. 1984) (exigencies of the moment in chasing bank robbers into a house were within the
hot pursuit exception).
29. 227 Va. 297, 315 S.E.2d 235 (1984).
30. See Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984).
31. The court stated: "The curtilage of a dwelling house is a space necessary and conven-
ient, habitually used for family purposes and the carrying on of domestic employment; the
yard, garden or field which is near to and used in connection with the dwelling." Wellford,
227 Va. at 302, 315 S.E.2d at 238 (quoting Bare v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 783, 795, 94
S.E.2d 168, 172 (1917)).
32. 229 Va. -, 331 S.E.2d 407 (1985).
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ered in the course of a legitimate inventory of the contents of a
motor vehicle in lawful police custody, is not unreasonable within
the intent of the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment."33
Perhaps the most significant Virginia search and seizure case of
the past year was the decision in Mosher Steel-Virginia v. Teig 4
The court held that probable cause for administrative search war-
rants may be of two distinct types. First, affidavits may establish
the likelihood of specific violations. In such situations, the stan-
dards for evaluating probable cause are identical to the standards
for criminal search warrants. In the alternative, affidavits may es-
tablish that in the absence of specific violations the administrative
inspection is based on more general, but still reasonable, legislative
or administrative standards. 35 In such situations, probable cause
requires that reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
inspection are satisfied with respect to the particular establish-
ment. 6 The Aguilar v. Texas 37 requirement that the affidavit con-
tain factual allegations, rather than bare conclusions, applies to
such affidavits. The affidavit must provide the specific facts under-
lying each step of the procedure by which a particular employer is
selected for an administrative inspection. Therefore, if a selection
is based on an industry's high hazard ranking, the application
must reveal specific empirical data resulting in that ranking.3 8 If a
particular employer is selected because of a high injury rate, the
afflant must substantiate the alleged injury rate with statistics. 9
To insure against arbitrary inspections of a particular employer,
the application should recite the employer's own inspection history
and the status of general scheduled inspections of all employers
subject to inspection by the regional division of the inspecting
agency.40 In Mosher, the court noted, but did not decide, the sub-
stantial question of whether a general inspection warrant violates
33. Id. at -, 331 S.E.2d at 415.
34. 229 Va. 95, 327 S.E.2d 87 (1985).
35. Id. at 103, 327 S.E.2d at 94. In such situations, a party may seek a pre-search declara-
tory judgment to determine the validity of the warrant and its underlying plan for a general
inspection. Id. at 102-03, 327 S.E.2d at 91.
36. Id. at 103, 327 S.E.2d at 94.
37. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
38. Mosher Steel-Virginia, 229 Va. at 104, 327 S.E.2d at 94.
39. Id. "A bare allegation that the inspection is part of an administrative plan and that
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the Virginia constitutional prohibition against general warrants.41
Another Virginia search and seizure case decided by the United
States Supreme Court was Haring v. Prosise.42 The Court recog-
nized that a defendant who pleads guilty in a criminal trial is not
estopped from pursuing a section 1983 civil action for an illegal
search and seizure. The waiver of fourth amendment rights applies
only to the criminal trial and has no effect outside the confines of
that proceeding. 4
Although Virginia adopted the good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule" in McCary v. Commonwealth,45 an interesting case
from the Eastern District of Virginia, United States v. Belcher,4
recognized that bad faith in deliberately avoiding the procedures
for issuance of a search warrant may render the search illegal.47
The Virginia Supreme Court has not ruled upon the "inevitable
discovery" doctrine adopted by the United States Supreme Court
in Nix v. Williams,4s but earlier cases indicate that Virginia will
follow the doctrine.49
The 1985 General Assembly expanded the items subject to for-
feiture in drug cases. "Everything of value furnished, or intended
to be furnished, in exchange for a controlled substance or mari-
juana . . ., and all moneys or other property, real or personal,
traceable to such an exchange" are now deemed forfeited to the
commonwealth.50 The court may also order a law enforcement
agency to take custody of substantial quantities of controlled sub-
stances and to make provision for ensuring the integrity of these
items.51
41. See VA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
42. 462 U.S. 306 (1983).
43. Id. at 317.
44. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984); United States v. Leon, 104 S.
Ct. 3405 (1984).
45. 228 Va. 219, 321 S.E.2d 637 (1984).
46. 577 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. Va. 1983).
47. Id. at 1252. See generally Bacigal, The Road to Exclusion is Paved With Bad Intents:
A Bad Faith Corollary to the Good Faith Exception, 87 WEST VA. L. REv. 747 (1985).
48. 105 S. Ct. 2681 (1985).
49. Keeter v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 134, 278 S.E.2d 841 (1981) (legal, warrantless entry
and evidence is in plain view); Warlick v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 263, 208 S.E.2d 746
(1974) (evidence of illegal involvement would have been gained inevitably without unlawful
action on officer's part).
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-249 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
51. Id. § 18.2-253.2.
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II. FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS
A. Confessions
The Virginia Supreme Court continues to recognize that the vol-
untariness of a confession is affected by such factors as the sus-
pect's intelligence, education and experience with the police;52 the
use of drugs or alcohol;53 police trickery and deceit;54 psychological
pressures;55 and promises of lenience, although the court has noted
that such promises "have generally been found insufficient to over-
bear a defendant's free will."56
The Miranda warnings are required only when there is both cus-
tody and interrogation.57 Thus, Addison v. Commonwealth s found
that the defendant was not in custody when "the defendant never
asked to leave, was never told either that he was or was not free to
leave, but in fact would have been permitted to depart at any time
if he had indicated a desire to do so.''51 Without mentioning the
test for defining interrogation,6 0 Bradshaw v. Commonwealth61
held the defendant's statement to be spontaneous under the fol-
lowing circumstances: The police seized two shotguns and told the
defendant they wanted to have them tested. As the officer wrote a
receipt for one gun, the defendant remarked, "That's not the one
that did it." The officer asked if the defendant wanted "to talk
about it," and without any further questioning by the officer the
defendant gave a fifteen or twenty minute narrative statement.6 2
The Virginia Supreme Court has not ruled upon the "public
52. Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 323 S.E.2d 577 (1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 2347 (1985); Simpson v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 557, 318 S.E.2d 386 (1984).
53. Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 314 S.E.2d 371, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 229
(1984). The court also recognized that statements made while intoxicated are not per se
involuntary. Boggs v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. _ _ 331 S.E.2d 407, 415 (1985) (quoting
United States v. Brown, 535 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1976)).
54. Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 605, 318 S.E.2d 298 (1984).
55. Jones v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 427, 323 S.E.2d 554 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
2713 (1985).
56. Rodgers, 227 Va. at 616, 318 S.E.2d at 304.
57. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3148 (1984) ("[A] person subjected to
custodial interrogation is entitled to the benefit of the procedural safeguards enunciated in
Miranda, regardless of the nature or severity of the offense of which he is suspected or for
which he was arrested.").
58. 224 Va. 713, 299 S.E.2d 521 (1983).
59. Id. at 717, 299 S.E.2d at 523.
60. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
61. 228 Va. 484, 323 S.E.2d 567 (1984).
62. Id. at 489-90, 323 S.E.2d at 570-71.
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safety exception" to Miranda recognized in New York v. Quarles,3
but the standard for valid waiver of Miranda rights was both clari-
fied and confused by recent cases. Poyner v. Commonwealth 4 en-
dorsed the holding of Oregon v. Elstad5 that an initial unwarned
confession does not automatically preclude the admissibility of a
second confession given after a subsequent administration of Mi-
randa warnings.6 6 Further clarification was provided in Washing-
ton v. Commonwealth,67 which held that a valid waiver once given
"will be presumed to continue in effect throughout subsequent cus-
todial interrogations until the suspect manifests, in some way
which would be apparent to a reasonable person, his desire to re-
voke it."68 However, confusion was created with respect to the
standard for waiver of counsel during interrogation. Edwards v.
Arizona 9 held that once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, a
subsequent waiver requires two separate determinations: (1) Did
the defendant initiate further communications? (2) Did the prose-
cution establish that the suspect made a knowing and intelligent
waiver of his rights?70 Oregon v. Bradshaw71 appeared to establish
a per se rule that the question of a knowing and intelligent waiver
could not be addressed unless there was a showing that the suspect
had initiated further communications. 72 But in Bunch v. Common-
wealth,78 the Virginia Supreme Court refused to recognize a per se
rule and indicated that the totality of circumstances test deter-
mines voluntary waiver even when the defendant did not initiate
further communication.7 4 The Virginia Supreme Court also distin-
guished Edwards in cases involving interrogation by different po-
lice officers regarding different crimes. 75
63. 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
64. 229 Va. 401, 329 S.E.2d 815, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 208 (1985); see also Boggs v.
Commonwealth, 229 Va. -, 331 S.E.2d 407 (1985) (unwarned, uncoerced confession was
not incriminating and Miranda was not violated).
65. 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).
66. Poyner, 229 Va. at 401, 329 S.E.2d at 822.
67. 228 Va. 535, 323 S.E.2d 577 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2347 (1985).
68. Id. at 548, 323 S.E.2d at 586.
69. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
70. Id. at 482-84. But see Poyner, 229 Va. 401, 329 S.E.2d 815 (1985) (a request to clarify
the right to counsel does not amount to a request for counsel).
71. 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
72. See Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982); United States v. Renda, 567 F. Supp. 487
(E.D. Va. 1983), aff'd without opinion, 758 F.2d 649 (4th Cir. 1985).
73. 225 Va. 423, 304 S.E.2d 271, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
74. Id. at 434, 304 S.E.2d at 276-77.
75. See, e.g., Simmons v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 111, 300 S.E.2d 918 (1983). When mili-
tary police had already read the defendant his rights and the defendant had requested
[Vol. 19:697
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The Virginia Supreme Court drew an important distinction be-
tween third-party, out-of-court confessions and the in-court testi-
mony of such declarants.76 An out-of-court statement of a person
admitting the commission of the crime with which the accused is
charged is admissible as a declaration against penal interest if the
declarant is unavailable and the declaration is reliable or trustwor-
thy.7 7 The question of reliability is dependent upon the facts and
circumstances of the case and turns upon a determination that
"there is anything substantial other than the bare confession to
connect the declarant with the crime. '17 However, if the declarant
is called as a witness he may be fully examined about his involve-
ment in the alleged crime. If the declarant denies making a prior
confession, his original statement is not available, and it is proper
to introduce proof of the alleged confession by others who heard
it.8o "IT]he truth of the alleged confession and the credibility of
the witness who undertook to repeat the declaration, must, like the
truthfulness of all other testimony, be settled by the jury.""'
The commonwealth has no right to introduce selected portions
of a defendant's confession and exclude those which tend to miti-
gate or excuse the offense charged. 2 Nor does the defendant have
a right to exclude portions which might inflame the passions of the
jury if the confession was voluntary and was the product of an es-
sentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.8 In Clozza v.
Commonwealth s4 the court recognized that only slight corrobora-
tive evidence is required when the commission of the crime has
been fully confessed by the accused.85
counsel, it was not a violation of Miranda for a civilian law enforcement officer to later
initiate questioning and obtain a confession for different crimes. Id. at 121, 300 S.E.2d at
923; McFadden v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 103, 300 S.E.2d 924 (1983). Where police officers
in two different locations were investigating different crimes, a request for counsel in one
instance did not prevent other police officers in other locations from initiating questioning
about other crimes. Id. at 109-10, 300 S.E.2d at 927.
76. Morris v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 145, 326 S.E.2d 693 (1985).
77. Id. at 146, 326 S.E.2d at 694 (quoting Ellison v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 404, 408, 247
S.E.2d 685, 686 (1978)).
78. Ellison, 219 Va. at 409, 247 S.E.2d at 686 (quoting Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va.
728, 748, 117 S.E. 843, 849 (1923)).
79. Morris, 229 Va. at 148, 326 S.E.2d at 695.
80. Id. at 149, 326 S.E.2d at 695 (quoting Hines, 136 Va. at 745, 117 S.E. at 848).
81. Morris, 229 Va. at 149, 326 S.E.2d at 695.
82. Boggs v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. .. , , 331 S.E.2d 407, 419 (1985).
83. Id. at -, 331 S.E.2d at 419.
84. 228 Va. 124, 321 S.E.2d 273 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1233 (1985).
85. Id. at 133, 321 S.E.2d at 279.
1985]
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B. Lineups and Identification Procedures
The Virginia Supreme Court decided only one significant case
dealing with identification procedures. McCary v. Commonwealth8
held that the witness's identification was reliable under the "total-
ity of the circumstances" test even when (1) fifteen months elapsed
between the crimes and the identification testimony at the prelimi-
nary hearing; (2) the police supplied the defendant's name as that
of the man whom the victims had described; and (3) the victims
were unable to identify the defendant from the photographic ar-
ray.8 7 The Virginia court has not yet addressed Hayes v. Florida,"8
which condemned both the involuntary removal of a suspect from
his home to a police station and his detention there for identifica-
tion purposes such as fingerprinting.8 9 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia upheld an identification
where the defendant was required to wear a false beard, a cap, and
sunglasses.90
C. Right to Counsel
Recent cases have cast doubt on the constitutional right to be
represented by counsel at ex parte communications between judges
and jurors.91 This past term both the United States9 2 and Vir-
ginia93 Supreme Courts denied claims that the defense has a con-
stitutional right to be present at every interaction between a judge
and jury. However, the 1985 Virginia General Assembly recognized
that "[n]o judge shall communicate in any way with a juror in a
criminal proceeding concerning the juror's conduct or any aspect of
the case during the course of the trial outside the presence of the
parties or their counsel. '94
The General Assembly also clarified provisions relating to com-
pensation of court-appointed counsel. Counsel appointed by the
court to represent an indigent charged with repeated violations of
the same section of the Code of Virginia, with each of such viola-
86. 228 Va. 219, 321 S.E.2d 637 (1984).
87. Id. at 234, 321 S.E.2d at 645.
88. 105 S. Ct. 1643 (1985).
89. Id. at 1647.
90. Griffin v. Commonwealth, 606 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Va. 1985).
91. See Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983).
92. United States v. Gagnon, 105 S. Ct. 1482, 1486 (1985) (per curiam).
93. Ellis v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 419, 423, 317 S.E.2d 479, 481-82 (1984).
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-263.1 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
706 [Vol. 19:697
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tions arising out of the same incident, occurrence, or transaction,
shall be compensated in an amount not to exceed the fee pre-
scribed for the defense of a single charge, if such offenses are tried
as part of the same judicial proceeding.9 5
In addition to compensation of counsel, the Code of Virginia au-
thorized the trial court to "direct the payment of such reasonable
expenses incurred by such court-appointed attorney as it deems
appropriate under the circumstances of the case."9 6 This provision
has been utilized to provide for state funding for services necessary
for an adequate defense, such as expert witnesses and private in-
vestigators, although the Virginia Supreme Court noted that provi-
sion of such services was not constitutionally required.9 7 Ake v.
Oklahoma,9" while limiting its holding to the state's responsibility
to provide psychiatric examination, also stated that "[a] criminal
trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indi-
gent defendant without making certain that he has access to the
raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense." 99
Such broad language will undoubtedly generate new claims for
state funding of services necessary for an adequate defense. What
had previously been an act of judicial grace in Virginia may be-
come a constitutional right. Nonetheless, in Watkins v. Common-
wealth,100 the court reaffirmed that there is no constitutional right
to appointment of a private investigator at public expense.'10
The Virginia Supreme Court made several changes in dealing
with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, but these changes
received mixed reviews from the Virginia General Assembly and
the federal courts. First, the Virginia Supreme Court abandoned
the "farce and mockery" standard to join the majority of jurisdic-
tions applying the standard of "reasonable competence" as the test
for effective representation of counsel.0 2 This change was noncon-
95. Id. § 19.2-163.
96. Id.
97. Quintana v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 127, 135, 295 S.E.2d 643, 646 (1982) (employ-
ment of an investigator by the court at public expense is an act of judicial grace not consti-
tutionally required), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1029 (1983); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va.
124, 314 S.E.2d 371, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 229 (1984); Martin v. Commonwealth, 221 Va.
436, 271 S.E.2d 123 (1980).
98. 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985); see also Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. -, 334 S.E.2d 838
(1985) (applying Ake).
99. 105 S. Ct. at 1094.
100. 229 Va. -, 331 S.E.2d 422 (1985).
101. Id. at -, 331 S.E.2d at 430.
102. Stokes v. Warden, 226 Va. 111, 116, 306 S.E.2d 882, 883 (1983).
19851
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troversial, and in fact the court acknowledged that it had been ap-
plying the new standard for a "considerable period of time.' 10 3 Be-
cause claims of inadequate representation of counsel normally
involve matters not appearing in the trial record, the Virginia
Supreme Court attempted to restrict "to habeas corpus proceed-
ings the litigation of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel."' 14
However, the 1985 Virginia General Assembly effectively negated
this holding and authorized consideration of such claims on direct
appeal "if all matters relating to such issue are fully contained
within the record of the trial.' 0 5 The court also applied the doc-
trine of laches to delays in filing a petition alleging ineffective as-
sistance of counsel, 10 6 but the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia held that the government must show
actual prejudice from the delay, which "cannot be presumed solely
from the passage of time."' 07 Both the Virginia'" and federal' 09
courts have noted that the constitutional standard for effective as-
sistance of counsel is no more stringent in capital cases than in
those where less severe punishments may be imposed. However,
the seriousness of the offense and the severity of the punishment
are factors which must be considered in assessing an attorney's
performance." 0
Church v. Commonwealth"' recognized that, although no partic-
ular ritual is required, the record must establish that a waiver of
counsel was knowingly made. The court reluctantly reversed the
conviction where there was a "fortuitous omission" of that part of
the record which might have established a waiver. 112
III. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Pre-Trial Release/Bail
In Heacock v. Commonwealth,"3 the court addressed some of
the confusion surrounding revocation of bail and forfeiture of
103. Id. at 116-17, 306 S.E.2d at 884.
104. Walker v. Mitchell, 224 Va. 568, 570, 299 S.E.2d 698, 699 (1983).
105. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-317.1 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
106. Walker, 224 Va. at 575, 299 S.E.2d at 702.
107. Walker v. Mitchell, 587 F. Supp. 1432, 1438 (E.D. Va. 1984).
108. Virginia Dep't of Corrections v. Clark, 227 Va. 525, 318 S.E.2d 399 (1984).
109. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
110. Clark, 227 Va. at 534, 318 S.E.2d at 403; see also Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
111. 230 Va. __, 2 V.L.R. 359 (1985).
112. Id. at -, 2 V.L.R. at 367.
113. 228 Va. 235, 321 S.E.2d 645 (1984).
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bond. The court held that a surety is not a party to a proceeding to
revoke bail, i.e., the previous release from custody. However, the
surety is an essential party to a bond forfeiture proceeding and is
entitled to notice and a hearing.114 At such a hearing, the common-
wealth must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant violated a condition of bond.1 5 A previous determina-
tion of violations at the bail revocation hearing (such determina-
tion being based on probable cause, and not on a preponderance
standard) is not prima facia proof for purposes of the bond forfei-
ture proceeding. 16 The court suggested that the difficulties created
by different standards of proof for bail revocation (probable cause)
and bond forfeiture (preponderance) could be avoided if the two
proceedings were combined in one hearing.1 17
B. Indictments and Charges
Although the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia require
that an indictment cite "the statute or ordinance that defines the
offense,"11 error or omission of the citation is harmless unless the
court finds that the defendant was thereby prejudiced in preparing
his defense. 1 9 A reference in the indictment to the violated ordi-
nance gives the defendant fair notice that the commonwealth in-
tends to prove elements such as scienter which are necessary for
the offense. 120
If two offenses are charged in a single count, only one conviction
and one sentence are permissible.1 21 Except for capital offenses,
every principal in the second degree and every accessory before the
fact may be indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all respects
114. Id. at 240, 321 S.E.2d at 648.
115. Id. at 241, 321 S.E.2d at 648.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 242, 321 S.E.2d at 649. Furthermore, Heacock applies only when bond was
revoked on some ground other than a failure to appear. "The absence of the accused is
conclusive proof" of the violation of the condition to appear. Id. at 241 n.3, 321 S.E.2d at
649 n.3.
118. VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A.6.
119. Stamper v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 707, 713, 324 S.E.2d 682, 686 (1985).
120. Wall Distrib., Inc. v. Newport News, 228 Va. 358, 323 S.E.2d 75 (1984); KMA, Inc. v.
Newport News, 228 Va. 365, 323 S.E.2d 78 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2324 (1985). "An
indictment need not be drafted in the exact words of the applicable statute so long as the
accused is given notice of the nature and character of the offense charged." Boggs v. Com-
monwealth, 229 Va. , _ , 331 S.E.2d 407, 420 (1985) (quoting Black v. Commonwealth,
223 Va. 274, 282, 288 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1982)).
121. Morris v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 206, 209, 321 S.E.2d 633, 635 (1984).
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as if a principal in the first degree.'22 The defendant may only be
convicted of the specific offense charged in the indictment; thus an
accused indicted for larceny by false pretenses cannot be convicted
upon evidence which establishes larceny by trick.123 "Where as
here, the Commonwealth elects to prosecute a defendant for a spe-
cific category of larceny, and no other, its case must either prevail
or fail upon that election.' ' 2 4 A variance is fatal when the proof is
different from and irrelevant to the crime defined in the indict-
ment and is, therefore, insufficient to prove the commission of the
crime charged. 125
C. Discovery
Materials in the hands of third parties are the proper subject of
a subpoena duces tecum if they "could be used at trial.' 26 Counsel
is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to examine discovery mate-
rial and prepare for its use at trial.127 If the commonwealth fails to
provide adequate discovery, "the court may order the Common-
wealth to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance,
or prohibit the Commonwealth from introducing evidence not dis-
closed, or the court may enter such other order as it deems just
under the circumstances.' 28 When a discovery violation does not
prejudice the substantial rights of a defendant, such undisclosed
material may be admitted into evidence.129
122. Riddick v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 244, 248, 308 S.E.2d 117, 119 (1983); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-18 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
123. Baker v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 192, 300 S.E.2d 788 (1983).
124. Id. at 194, 300 S.E.2d at 789; see also Edenton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 413, 416,
316 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1984) (traffic offenses).
125. Hawks v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 244, 321 S.E.2d 650 (1984) (evidence of rape is
relevant to charge that defendant intended to deprive victim of liberty); Graybeal v. Com-
monwealth, 228 Va. 736, 324 S.E.2d 698 (1985) (proof that the defendant broke into and
entered a trailer failed to prove that he broke into an office or storehouse as stated in the
indictment).
126. Cox v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 324, 328, 315 S.E.2d 228, 230 (1984).
127. Id.; see also Gilchrist v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 540, 546, 317 S.E.2d 784, 787
(1984).
128. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-265.4 (Cure. Supp. 1985).
129. Griffin v. Commonwealth, 606 F. Supp. 941 (E.D. Va. 1985); see also Davis v. Com-
monwealth, 230 Va. -, 335 S.E.2d 375 (1985) (where inculpatory pictures were withheld




Any delay caused by a demand for separate trials by a defendant
indicted on different charges is not excluded from the statutory
speedy trial period.13 0 In the absence of a formal motion for a con-
tinuance, the defendant is deemed to have agreed to and concurred
in delays necessitated by his own motion.13' However, as the court
noted in Godfrey v. Commonwealth, 32 the commonwealth's rea-
sons for delay must appear on the record. "Representations of
counsel, or even the trial'judge, if not supported by the record, are
insufficient. . . .Continuances in criminal cases, therefore, must
be documented to enable us to review and evaluate them when
they are challenged."' 33
E. Double Jeopardy
The mere fact that a lesser offense is charged at the preliminary
hearing does not preclude the commonwealth from also charging a
greater offense arising out of the same act or transaction. 3 4 "If a
single act results in injury to two or more persons, a corresponding
number of distinct offenses may result."'3 5
F. Potential Bias of Judge or Prosecutor
The trial judge must exercise reasonable discretion to determine
whether he possesses such bias as would deny a party a fair trial.3 6
"Merely because a trial judge is familiar with a party and his legal
difficulties through prior judicial hearings. . . does not automati-
cally or inferentially raise the issue of bias.' 3 7 The Virginia Su-
preme Court refused to overturn the common law rule which per-
mits the appearance of private counsel to assist the prosecution. A
private prosecutor, however, is subject to the same standard of
conduct as is a public prosecutor.'38 To remedy considerable ad-
ministrative problems, the Virginia General Assembly amended
130. Walker v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 5, 11, 301 S.E.2d 28, 31 (1983).
131. Stephens v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 224, 233, 301 S.E.2d 22, 29 (1983).
132. 227 Va. 460, 317 S.E.2d 781 (1984).
133. Id. at 464, 317 S.E.2d at 783.
134. Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 484, 492, 323 S.E.2d 567, 572 (1984).
135. Morris v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 206, 212, 321 S.E.2d 633, 636 (1984).
136. Deahl v. Winchester Dep't of Social Services, 224 Va. 664, 672-73, 299 S.E.2d 863,
867 (1983) (quoting Barry v. Sigler, 373 F.2d 835, 836 (8th Cir. 1967)).
137. Id.
138. Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 387, 329 S.E.2d 22 (1985).
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the Code to provide that rejection of a plea bargain disqualifies a




The Virginia Supreme Court has provided the first judicial inter-
pretation of the 1981 statutory change which gave counsel the right
to examine prospective jurors.140 LeVasseur v. Commonwealth414
recognized that counsel does not have an unlimited right to "pro-
pound any question he wishes.' 1 42 The court must afford a party a
full and fair opportunity to question jurors but the "trial judge re-
tains the discretion to determine when the parties have had suffi-
cient opportunity to do so."' 43 Counsel's questions must relate to
"any of the four criteria set forth in [Code § 8.01-358].' It is also
discretionary with the trial court whether to permit examination of
each venireman out of the presence of the others, but counsel
should be afforded the opportunity to challenge jurors out of the
presence of the panel. 145
Reluctance to serve as a juror is not grounds for disqualifica-
tion,146 but "when a juror is related by blood or marriage to either
party of record or a victim in a criminal prosecution, the potential
for prejudice is inherent and the law conclusively presumes partial-
ity.' ' 147 The court thus affirmed the absolute common law rule dis-
qualifying a venireman who is related within the ninth degree of
consanguinity or affinity to a party to the trial.14 The exclusion of
veniremen irrevocably committed to voting against the death pen-
139. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-153 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
140. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-358 (Repl. Vol. 1984). Previously such examination was with
permission of the court.
141. 225 Va. 564, 304 S.E.2d 644 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984).
142. Id. at 581, 304 S.E.2d at 653.
143. Id.
144. Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 493, 505, 323 S.E.2d 539, 546 (1984) (quoting
LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 581, 304 S.E.2d at 653 (1983)), vacated on other grounds, 105 S. Ct.
2315 (1985).
145. Id.
146. Calhoun v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 256, 262, 307 S.E.2d 896, 899-900 (1983).
147. Gray v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 591, 594, 311 S.E.2d 409, 410 (1984).
148. Elam v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 113, 116, 326 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1985) (juror could
not be challenged merely because she was the sister of a former commonwealth's attorney);
see also Calhoun, 226 Va. at 263, 307 S.E.2d at 900 (court declined to adopt a per se rule
disqualifying a prospective juror solely on the ground that sometime in the past the com-
monwealth's attorney had represented him).
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alty does not violate the defendant's sixth amendment right to a
jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. 149 In Had-
dad v. Commonwealth,'5" the trial court abused its discretion in
denying a mistrial after a juror expressed an opinion to third per-
sons during the trial proceedings.
The court continues to affirm the trial judge's wide discretion in
deciding whether to sequester the jury,"5' and a party moving to
change venue still must carry the burden of proof.152 The court
said:
This burden cannot be carried merely by a showing that the pro-
spective jurors have been exposed to pretrial publicity, or even by a
showing that the jurors may have arrived at some preconceived no-
tion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is not required
that they be entirely ignorant of the facts and issues. It is sufficient
if they can lay aside their impressions or opinions and render a ver-
dict based on the evidence presented in court. 5 3
The General Assembly amended the Code to prohibit an em-
ployer from taking "any adverse personnel action" against any per-
son summoned for jury duty. 4 Any employer violating this provi-
sion shall be guilty of a Class 4 misdemeanor.
H. Trial
The 1985 General Assembly enacted four provisions which will
have an impact upon criminal trials. First, a defendant or his coun-
sel may tape record proceedings in general district court. 55 Sec-
ond, defense counsel or the attorney for the commonwealth may
149. Poyner v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 401, 413-14, 329 S.E.2d 815, 824-25, cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 208 (1985); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985). Wainwright held
that even if the juror is not irrevocably committed to voting against the death penalty, he
may be excused if his views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his
duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Id. at 846 (quoting Adams
v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
150. 229 Va. 325, 329-30, 329 S.E.2d 17, 20 (1985).
151. Boggs v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. _ 331 S.E.2d 407 (1985); Jones v. Common-
wealth, 228 Va. 427, 323 S.E.2d 554 (1984); Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 493, 323
S.E.2d 539 (1984).
152. Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 323 S.E.2d 577 (1984).
153. Id. at 544, 323 S.E.2d at 584; Boggs, 229 Va. at -, 331 S.E.2d at 416.
154. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-465.1. (Cum. Supp. 1985).
155. Id. § 16.1-69.35:2.
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raise the question of the defendant's competency to-stand trial.'56
Third, photographs of goods or merchandise taken in designated
larcenies and burglaries are admissible to the same extent as if the
goods or merchandise had been introduced in evidence. 157 Finally,
communications between ministers of religion and penitents are
privileged in criminal prosecutions. 58
The Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that the
prosecution may meet its burden of proof with wholly circumstan-
tial evidence, although all necessary circumstances must be consis-
tent with guilt, inconsistent with innocence, and must exclude any
other rational hypothesis to a moral certainty.' 59 The hypotheses
"which must be thus excluded are those which flow from the evi-
dence itself, and not from the imaginations of defense counsel.' 6 0
The court also held that the malice required for second degree
murder normally cannot be implied from negligent operation of a
motor vehicle.'" However, Fleming v. United States 62 presented a
factual situation wherein reckless operation of a vehicle would
properly sustain a conviction of murder.
The court also reaffirmed previous holdings on the entrapment
defense, 6 ' the McNaughten test for insanity, 6 4 and recognized
that failure to sequester a witness may be harmless error. 165 In
Church v. Commonwealth,6 the court examined recent statutory
changes and held that the interspousal communication privilege
applies in criminal prosecutions. 6"
156. Id. § 19.2-169.1.
157. Id. § 19.2-270.1.
158. Id. § 19.2-271.3.
159. Bishop v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 164, 169, 313 S.E.2d 390, 393 (1984); Dukes v.
Commonwealth, 227 Va. 119, 122, 313 S.E.2d 382, 383 (1984) (quoting Inge v. Common-
wealth, 217 Va. 360, 366, 228 S.E.2d 563, 567 (1976)).
160. Cook v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 427, 433, 309 S.E.2d 325, 329 (1983), quoted with
approval in Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 493, 511, 323 S.E.2d 539, 550 (1984); Elam v.
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 113, 115, 326 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1985).
161. Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 273, 322 S.E.2d 216 (1984).
162. 672 F.2d 905 (3d. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982).
163. Stamper, 228 Va. 707, 324 S.E.2d 682 (1985).
164. Price v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 452, 459, 323 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1984).
165. Watkins v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 331 S.E.2d 422, 433 (1985).
166. 230 Va. -, 335 S.E.2d 823 (1985).





The General Assembly established a procedure whereby defen-
dants charged with a misdemeanor first offense against property
may be placed on probation without adjudication of guilt."6 8 Baker
v. Commonwealth 69 interpreted the Code (prior to the 1984
amendment) to authorize court-ordered restitution only when the
defendant is placed on probation. 7 0 In re Commonwealth's Attor-
ney 71 recognized that the Virginia General Assembly has divested
the trial judge of all discretion with respect to mandatory punish-
ment for use of a firearm while committing certain felonies. 7 2 The
mandatory sentence is "inflexible" and shall not be suspended, nor
may the court delay imposition of sentence or stay its execution.173
A juvenile transferred to circuit court and tried by a jury has the
right to have his sentence fixed by the judge. 4
In addition to rejecting the familiar challenges to the constitu-
tionality of capital punishment, the court decided a number of is-
sues relating to imposition of the death sentence. As to the aggra-
vating factors for the death penalty, Poyner v. Commonwealth17 5
held that vileness or torture includes "psychological torture." In
Jones v. Commonwealth,76 the court recognized that mutilation,
disfigurement or sexual assault committed on a corpse evidences
depravity of mind. The court also decided that prior unadjudicated
criminal activity is admissible to establish dangerousness. 177 As to
mitigating circumstances, Department of Corrections v. Clark1 78
held that the defendant has a constitutional right to present virtu-
ally unlimited evidence in mitigation; the commonwealth has an
absolute right to cross-examine witnesses on a matter relevant to
punishment which the defendant has put in issue by direct exami-
168. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303.2 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
169. 230 Va. , 335 S.E.2d 276 (1985).
170. Id. at -, 335 S.E.2d at 277.
171. 229 Va. 159, 163, 226 S.E.2d 695, 697 (1985).
172. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-53.1 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
173. In re Commonwealth's Attorney, 229 Va. at 163, 226 S.E.2d at 698.
174. Ballard v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 213, 321 S.E.2d 284 (1984).
175. 229 Va. 401, 425-26, 329 S.E.2d 815, 832 (1985).
176. 228 Va. 427, 448, 323 S.E.2d 554, 565 (1984).
177. Poyner, 229 Va. at 418, 329 S.E.2d at 827-28; Watkins, 229 Va. at __, 331 S.E.2d at
436. In Peterson v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 289, 298, 302 S.E.2d 520, 526, cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 202 (1983), the court noted that if dangerousness is to be proved by evidence of other
crimes: "[iln fairness to the defendant,. . . the preferred practice is to make known to him
before trial the evidence that is to be adduced at the penalty stage if he is found guilty."
178. 227 Va. 525, 539, 318 S.E.2d 399, 406 (1984).
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nation of the witness;" 9 in the absence of a request the trial judge
is not required to instruct the jury on possible mitigating circum-
stances; 180 and evidence of the defendant's impaired mental capac-
ity need not amount to insanity or incompetence to stand trial. l81
When the jury returns a verdict finding the death sentence war-
ranted under both the vileness and the dangerousness standards,
"it is of no importance whether the instruction on 'vileness' was
correct so long as the instruction on 'dangerousness' was
correct."' 2
J. Appeals
The Virginia General Assembly revised provisions by which an
aggrieved party may appeal to the court of appeals, and provided
for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from final judgments in-
volving a petition for habeas corpus. 83 The General Assembly also
provided for appeals by the commonwealth of dismissals based on
grounds that a statute is unconstitutional, or the suppression of
evidence on grounds that the evidence was obtained in violation of
certain constitutional provisions. 84 The provisions of this act take
effect December 1, 1986, if approved in a referendum in November
1986.
179. Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 549, 323 S.E.2d 577, 586-87 (1984).
180. Briley v. Bass, 750 F.2d 1238, 1244 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1855
(1985).
181. Washington, 228 Va. at 549, 323 S.E.2d at 584-86.
182. Briley, 750 F.2d at 1245; see also Watkins, 229 Va. at -, 331 S.E.2d at 437.
183. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-116.05, 17-116.05:1 (Cune. Supp. 1985).
184. Id. § 19.2-398.
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